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Mechanised Horsemen: Red Cavalry
Commanders and the Second World War
Stephen Brown (University o f Wollongong)
A casual observer could be forgiven for thinking that there were
two Red Armies in the Second World War. B y the end o f
September 1941, the Red Army had effectively lost Ukraine,
eastern Poland, Byelorussia, the Baltic States, much o f European
Russia and about half o f the five-million-strong force with which it
began the war three months earlier. It was seemingly powerless in
the face o f the Nazi invasion. The Red Army o f 1943-45
reconquered all o f this territory, albeit at the cost o f millions o f
lives, and drove the Nazis back to Berlin achieving total victory in
May 1945.
As for why the Red Army did so badly in 1941, there is no
single cause. Some historians argue that superior technology gave
the Germans an edge, others that the combat experience gained by
the Germans in the conquest o f Western Europe in 1940 was
decisive. Post-Stalin Soviet writers emphasised Hitler’s successful
surprise attack. In a spectacular blunder, Stalin allowed him self to
think that the three million foreign soldiers on his border
represented Hitler’s way o f testing his commitment to the NaziSoviet Pact o f August 1939. The Red Army was unsure whether to
focus its efforts upon building fortified positions at the frontier or
to rely upon its tanks to manoeuvre against the enemy. In the
event, the Red Army did neither and its soldiers either were killed
or captured to no good military purpose.1
The Red Army’s rapid expansion after 1934 was not
accompanied by the necessary increase in the number o f competent
officers needed to prepare the new recruits for their tasks, a
shortfall that was exacerbated by the arrests and executions o f the
late 1930s.2 The Red Army was purged in 1937-38 o f its best and
brightest officers. In their place, Stalin promoted his own buddies
from the era o f the Russian Civil War o f 1918-20. Stalin’s choice

o f Red Army leadership centred on the Red cavalry, an arm o f
seivice fanatically loyal to Stalin but seemingly hopelessly out o f
date because o f the mechanisation o f warfare.
One o f these factors, the role o f the Red cavalrymen, is the
focus o f this paper. Many commentators have criticised the
pernicious role o f a politically loyal but militarily inept clique o f
veteran cavalry officers who dominated the Red Army for much o f
the inter-war period and whose influence was accentuated by the
purges. It is a staple o f writing about the Second World War that
the Red Army suffered from its Civil War heritage, especially its
reliance upon cavalry.3 Stalin first attached him self to the Red
cavalry during the Civil War, the last war in which horse and rider
played a decisive role. It was an alliance that benefited both sides.
Stalin was determined to build both a reputation and a support base
in the Red Army. In Stalin, the Red cavalrymen found a valuable
political patron. After the Civil War, Stalin and the Red
cavalrymen advanced in tandem, each a crucial pillar o f support
for the other. K.E. Voroshilov was the most prominent o f the Red
cavalrymen, serving as Peoples Commissar for Military and Naval
Affairs from 1925 to 1934 and as Commissar for Defence from
1934 to 1940. Voroshilov has often been criticised as an ignoramus
on horseback, presiding over a reactionary military establishment
dominated by cavalrymen and unwilling to come to terms with the
new military technology o f tanks and aircraft.4
The influence o f the Red cavalrymen was especially
pronounced after the notorious military purge o f 1937-38 led to the
arrest and execution o f thousands o f senior officers. The principal
victim o f the purge was M.N. Tukhachevskii, the Red Army’s
leading authority on mechanised war and Voroshilov’s great rival.
Ninety per cent o f the Red Army’s most senior command was
removed. O f the ten members o f the Chief Military Council who
survived, seven were veterans o f the First Cavalry Army, the Civil
War cavalry force commanded by Voroshilov and his life-long
friend and ally, S.M. Budennyi. The cavalrymen benefited from
the purge in that they experienced rapid promotion in the years
1937-41. On the other hand, exercising control o f the Red Army at
this time was a poisoned chalice given the chaotic state o f an army
that had suffered the loss, often permanent, o f more than forty

thousand officers. When Voroshilov was removed from his post as
Commissar for Defence after the costly Winter War against
Finland in 1939-40, he had to admit to his successor that the
situation o f the Red Army could hardly be worse.5
The disastrous performance against Finland and the
spectacular success o f the Nazi invasion the following year would
seem to be convincing proof that the legacy o f the Red cavalry was
one o f great harm to the Red Army. Nonetheless, the suggestion
made in this paper is that the influence o f the Red cavalrymen
should be viewed not only in terms o f the defeat o f 1941 but also
in terms o f the victories o f 1943-45. It will be argued that
cavalrymen played a significant part in the Red victory, that the
majority o f Red cavalrymen did not fit the stereotype o f
conservative horsemen resistant to the mechanisation o f warfare,
and that their training and outlook made them well suited to their
new tasks when, from 1937, Red cavalrymen were redeployed in
large numbers to the mechanised corps and other ground forces.
They brought with them a cavalry culture that aided rather than
hindered the Red victory.
To make this point, it is necessary first to re-examine three
myths concerning the Red cavalry on the eve o f the Nazi invasion.
The first myth revolves around Voroshilov and his alleged role in
prolonging the stultifying influence o f an anachronistic Red
cavalry. Voroshilov’s legacy to the Red Army was a complex one
and he was guilty o f significant errors o f judgement. Promoting a
conservative cavalry culture was, however, not one o f his faults.
From the evidence made available from Soviet archives, it is
clear that Voroshilov was neither hostile to the mechanisation o f
the Red Army nor an advocate o f the Red cavalry. The transcripts
o f the annual Red Army reviews conducted by the Chief Military
Council and its predecessor reveal that Voroshilov, far from being
obsessed with old-style cavalry warfare, was pragmatic, realistic
and critical o f the “Don Quixotes” as he liked to call those who
thought that cavalry would dominate the battlefield o f the next
war. Like nearly everyone else, Voroshilov knew that the internal
combustion engine would supersede the horse and any nostalgia he
might have felt for the days o f the Civil War was tempered by a
measured appreciation o f the significant weaknesses displayed by

the mounted arm in the war against the Poles in 1920. Voroshilov
believed, correctly, that cavalry would have a niche role in the
coming war but one that would support the infantry, tanks and
planes, not substitute for them.
During his fifteen years in charge o f the Red Army,
Voroshilov presided over and actively encouraged the
mechanisation o f the Red Army. The Red Army could call upon
only 100 tanks in 1928. In 1938, the Red Army boasted 15,000
tanks, the largest tank park in the world. Meanwhile the proportion
o f cavalry remained at the same level throughout Voroshilov’s
tenure — about 10 per cent o f the total — until 1937 when it began
to fall not just as a proportion o f the total force but in absolute
numbers. Voroshilov often crossed swords with Tukhachevskii,
but the debate was not about whether tanks were valuable but
about how they should be employed.7 The Red Army developed
the world’s first mechanised corps in 1932, an innovation that
comprised nearly 500 tanks and 200 armoured vehicles in a single
unit. It is true that Voroshilov was sceptical o f massed tank corps,
an idea championed by Tukhachevskii, and in 1939 readily
accepted the opinion o f the Red Army’s leading post-purge tank
authority, D.G. Pavlov, that the mechanised corps should be
broken up. Pavlov argued that massed tank units failed the test o f
battle in the Spanish Civil War and eastern Poland and should be
parcelled out as infantry support.8 Voroshilov and Pavlov were
proved wrong on this point and the decision was quickly reversed
in 1940, the first decision made by Voroshilov’s replacement as
Commissar for Defence, S.K. Timoshenko. To be wrong on
particular issues is not the same as opposing the mechanisation o f
the Red Army.
It is worth noting that when the purge arrived in 1937, it
came from outside the Red Army, that is, its genesis lay with
Stalin and the NKVD. It is equally true that Voroshilov and the
Red cavalrymen, once prompted, became enthusiastic purgers.9
Whatever the motives for the purge, its aim was not to restore the
cavalry to its former place o f glory. The Red cavalry halved in size
between 1937 and 1941, at the same time as the remainder o f the
Red Army grew rapidly.10 In other words, the purge coincided with
a dramatic reduction in the size o f the Red cavalry and the

movement o f cavalrymen to other arms. Cavalrymen presided over
the purge but the preservation o f the cavalry arm was obviously
not part o f the agenda.
While the 80,000 cavalry remaining, at least on paper, in
1941 represented a tiny fraction o f the five million strong Red
Army, it might be argued that this was 80,000 too many. One
reason the cavalry survived as long as did was that even the tank’s
most ardent supporters acknowledged its tendency to break down
and its continuing vulnerability to enemy fire. As G.K. Zhukov
would later recall, there was a lot to criticise about the tanks in the
possession o f the Red Army even in 1938:
They were fast and had considerable firepower. Indeed, our
probable adversaries had nothing to equal them in this respect in
the same class. However, they were not manoeuvrable enough,
vulnerable to gunfire, and broke down much too often. Besides
they had petrol engines, which made them easily inflammable.11

A second myth is that the Red cavalry received special treatment
from Stalin who overvalued his Civil War experience.
Exaggerating the importance o f the Civil War is one o f the errors
usually attributed to Stalin and his cavalrymen allies. The Red
cavalry, the symbol o f the Civil War, is often,described as Stalin’s
favourite arm o f service12 In reality, Stalin was too knowledgeable
about modem war to be sentimental about the cavalry. When in
April 1940 Stalin appeared at the party-military conference
organised to review the disastrous war against Finland, the Soviet
dictator noted that in modem war, artillery, air power and tanks
were what counted. About the experience o f the Civil War, Stalin
was wholly negative. A s he put it:
People are still dominated by this cult o f the traditions and
experience of the Civil War and it deprives them of the
psychological possibility to adjust to the new methods of waging a
contemporary war [.. ,]13

Stalin singled out M.P. Kovalev, a former cavalryman who was
trying to carve out a new career as an army commander:
Comrade Kovalev performed worst. As a good soldier who had
fought in the Civil War and become a hero and gained fame, he
found it hard to shake off the experience of the Civil War that has

become inadequate today. The traditions and experiences of the
Civil War are absolutely inadequate and those who believe them
adequate will certainly perish.14

Stalin was not the first to criticise the Civil War experience. Rather
than glorifying the Civil War, it was a standard rhetorical device
for Red Army commanders in the inter-war years to point out that
the coming war would be nothing like the Civil War. M.V. Frunze,
L.D. Trotsky and Voroshilov him self routinely made statements
criticising “Civil War attitudes” just as Stalin would do in the
quotations above. Red Army commanders lived in fear o f being
charged with faying to re-fight the wars o f the past.
Stalin, i f anything, undervalued the contribution that the Civil
War military experience might make to wars o f the future. His tune
only changed after the Second World War. Commentators noted
that the Second World War repeated the pattern o f the Civil War;
the Red Army could not hold ground at first, was driven back
towards Moscow but then manoeuvred successfully to punch holes
in the defences o f an overstretched opponent. Soviet writers after
the Second World War often drew comparisons between the
cavalry o f the Civil War and the tank operations o f 1941-45. With
its sixteen thousand sabres and its supporting cast o f infantry,
artillery and machine guns, the First Cavalry Army constituted, for
Soviet writers, an example o f strategic cavalry, that is, capable o f
operating independently on the broader theatre o f war and not
limited, like most other cavalry, to reconnaissance, battlefield
charges, pursuits and raids.
After the Second World War, Stalin’s propagandists even
claimed that the operations o f the First Cavalry Army, by
combining mobility, firepower and mass to outflank and encircle
the enemy, was the real basis for the concept o f Deep Operations
in the 1930s and the successful tank battles o f the Second World
War.15 While the connection between cavalry operations in the
Civil War and tank operations in the Second World War was
exaggerated in order to avoid any mention o f Tukhachevskii’s role,
these post-war claims suggest that the value o f the Civil War as a
laboratory for war in the future almost certainly was
underestimated rather than exaggerated before 1941. P.A.

Rotmistrov, a former cavalryman and celebrated tank commander
in the Second World War, summed up this view when he praised
the experience o f the cavalry in the Civil War, especially its
characteristic:
massing in the decisive direction, sudden and quick blows using
manoeuvre, seizing the flanks with the aim of ensuring his
complete defeat. These principles lay at the basis of the working
out of a theory of using new means of struggle, tank warfare.16

A third myth is the prevalent idea that cavalrymen are by definition
conservative because their arm seems to change so little with the
passage o f time. The popular image o f the European cavalryman
after the Napoleonic Wars was that o f a pampered aristocrat
clinging to an outdated mode o f warfare. The image captures only
part o f the story o f an arm o f service that made strenuous efforts to
modernise. This was true especially o f the tsar’s cavalry. The
Russian cavalry was the first to remodel itself on the basis o f the
lessons o f the American Civil War o f 1861-65, training to engage
the enemy both mounted and dismounted and to make more use o f
firepower to complement the more traditional mass formation
charges. These lessons did not enable the cavalry to impose its
stamp upon the trench warfare o f the First World War but would
prove invaluable in the Russian Civil War.
Budennyi and Voroshilov’s First Cavalry Army was the
largest and most successful unit o f Red cavalry in the Civil War.
Budennyi would later find him self saddled with a reputation as a
cavalry conservative. However, in the Civil War, Budennyi was
criticised by his opponents for sullying the reputation o f the
cavalry with his unorthodox tactics o f refusing to charge and
instead relying upon firepower to win battles.17 Having failed to
attract sufficient numbers o f tsarist officers or Cossacks, groups
that gravitated towards the anti-Bolshevik White movement in the
Civil War, the Red cavalry made a virtue out o f necessity by using
the firepower o f revolvers and machine guns to neutralise the
White advantage in horsemanship and swordplay. Budennyi’s
cavalrymen preferred the revolver to the sword and became expert
in using machine guns mounted on peasant carts to soften up their
opponents.

In summer 1920, the First Cavalry Army moved rapidly
across Ukraine and into southern Poland. When battles went to
•plan, they followed the pattern noted by an American observer:
Budennyi invariably tried encircling movements in order to reach
the rear of the opponent without fighting. If he ran into opposition,
he did not persist but tried elsewhere [...] Having four divisions at
his disposal, he could feel the line at different points with part of
his force while the remainder was in reserve, ready to exploit a
success [...] In this method of handling cavalry, Budennyi may be
regarded almost as a model to be followed.18

This cost-effective manoeuvring worked only part o f the time.
Casualties overall were high, a fact that is not surprising given that
the Poles, in particular, had modem weapons, including air power.
In the case o f the Polish campaign, ten thousand cavalrymen, more
than half the initial force, were out o f action after four months o f
fighting.19 In the words o f Isaac Babel, the celebrated short-story
writer who served under Budennyi, to fight with the First Cavalry
Army was to attend “a huge, never-ending service for the dead”.20
The tank armies o f the Second World War would fight on these
same battlefields and faithfully repeat this pattern o f continual
movement despite appalling casualties.
During the 1920s and 1930s, cavalry was neither the
pampered child o f the Red Army nor a stagnant backwater. It was
not enough for the cavalryman to know how to ride, shoot and take
care o f his horse, though these tasks were difficult enough. Cavalry
was under constant pressure to improve its performance, to master
dismounted action in the 1920s and to work closely with tanks and
aircraft in the 1930s. Precisely because they were constantly under
attack as anachronistic, the cavalrymen knew that they had to
justify their existence or be pensioned off. It was an arm that
prided itself on initiative and independence, important qualities in
a Stalinist setting that was too often characterised by routine and
conformity. Theirs was a Sisyphean task for there was simply no
way to make cavalry sufficiently safe from bullet and shell to
satisfy the critics.
The pressure did not come simply from well-known critics
such as Tukhachevskii or V.K. Triandifillov.21 Until the purges,
the Red Army command was home to lively debate and criticism

concerning the performance o f the various arms. In 1928, I.E. Iakhtold Budennyi that he “should not curse people who only desire
good to the cavalry. We must make radical changes in terms o f
getting the cavalry’s weapons right and in terms o f cooperation
with in fan try. The cavalry costs us millions and we will simply
have to shoot it in time o f war.”22 A.S. Bubnov, who formerly
served with the First Cavalry Army, agreed, claiming that “if the
government viewed a proper evaluation o f the cavalry, it would
ask us why are w e wasting the money” 23 On this occasion,
Budennyi’s only comeback was to insist that “in war-time, we will
show you”.24
For cavalrymen passionately committed to then arm, the
hope was to prove their critics wrong. They could take comfort in
the fact that in 1928, there was no real possibility o f abandoning
cavalry altogether. In the absence o f sufficient numbers o f tanks
and armoured vehicles, cavalry remained the principal means o f
mobility on the battlefield and the wider theatre o f war. In the
1920s, the Red cavalry attempted to display its expertise in
firepower, to be effective fighting dismounted and mounted and to
protect itself from air attack. In the 1930s the new Soviet strategy
o f Deep Battle incorporated cavalrymen who were to work
alongside the tanks in penetrating the deep rear o f the enemy. The
principal trend in the 1930s was the attempt to create a
“mechanised” or “armoured” cavalry that would work in tandem
with the mechanised corps.
The pressures upon the Red cavalrymen did not let up. In
1936, for example, Voroshilov complained that “the horse is too
vulnerable to the air, to enemy firepower and to chemical warfare,
so much so that it will be difficult for the cavalry to wage war at
aH” 25
cavapy division already had an artillery regiment, a
tank regiment and was well equipped with machine guns. The next
step, Voroshilov proposed, was to get rid o f one o f the three
cavalry regiments and replace it with an infantry-machine gun
regiment. The following year, the cavalry commanders themselves
acknowledged how difficult it was to defend itself against air
attack. Their demand was for an anti-aircraft division using tank
tracks that would keep up with the cavalry. Cavalry meanwhile had
to focus its attention on movement at night, the only avenue it had

to avoid detection from the air. Changes to the cavalry’s
organization and tactics were sometimes implemented successfully
and sometimes revised or shelved altogether. What was constant
was the frantic race to find a winning formula for the beleaguered
horsemen. For some, the sensible response was to admit defeat but,
according to Zhukov, for the best and brightest o f the cavalrymen,
the challenge was to prepare better for modem war.
As Inspector o f Cavalry, Budennyi was indefatigable in his
efforts to publicise the virtues o f the Red cavalry even i f that
meant denigrating its rival, the tank. Budennyi could barely
contain his glee when at the review o f 1936, he was able to seize
upon a report that “the speed o f tanks is a concern because in
mountain conditions the tank only moves at one and a half
kilometres an hour”. Budennyi noted that “at that rate, it will be
vulnerable not only to artillery but to spears”.26 Yet even Budennyi
effectively surrendered in 1937 when he accepted promotion out o f
the cavalry to the command o f the M oscow Military District.
Budennyi’s legacy was not a nineteenth-century cavalry capable
only o f charges and sabre rattling but a mounted force that would
have been unrecognisable even to those who fought in the Civil
War. On the eve o f the Nazi invasion, a standard cavalry division,
apart from its 9,240 cavalrymen, comprised thirty-four tanks,
eighteen armoured vehicles and 136 pieces o f artillery. Far from
being cocooned from the realities o f modem war, Red cavalrymen
were well acquainted with their inevitable replacement, the tank.
The Red cavalry therefore was dynamic out o f necessity,
more undervalued than overvalued and treated with much more
scepticism by its military and political masters than most
commentators recognise. Most importantly, it produced some good
soldiers. It is certainly true that former cavalrymen were in charge
o f the Red Army that was defeated in 1941. When the Nazis
invaded, Stalin placed his trusted cavalrymen in command o f the
Soviet frontier. Voroshilov commanded the North-West Front at
Leningrad, S.K. Timoshenko was in charge o f the West Front at
Minsk and Budennyi led the South-West Front protecting Kiev.
Like the Red Army as a whole, the veterans o f the First Cavalry
Army failed in their efforts to repel this devastating attack.

On the other hand, it was a younger generation o f former
cavalrymen who commanded the Red Army when it was winning.
The turning-point battle o f the Second World War was Stalingrad
in 1942-43. Three o f the principal Red commanders at Stalingrad
were G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovksii and A.I. Eremenko. All
three were recycled Red cavalrymen who attended the Leningrad
Cavalry School together in 1924 and later made a successful
transition to command mechanised units. Arguably, the most
famous and successful soldier o f the Second World War was
Stalin’s wartime Deputy Commissar for Defence, Zhukov. Zhukov
was trained as a cavalryman, fought in the Civil War and even
commanded the Fourth Cavalry Division, formerly the spearhead
o f the First Cavalry Army. He left the cavalry only in 1939 when
he fought the Japanese in the Far East. In his memoirs, Zhukov
pointed out that his transition from Red cavalryman to Soviet
marshal was not a fluke. Because o f its prestige from the Civil
War, the cavalry attracted many o f the best and brightest
volunteers.27
Zhukov and his classmates were the advance guard for a large
posse o f Red cavalrymen whose careers were transformed in the
years leading up to the Second World War. After 1939 whole
corps and divisions o f cavalry became the basis for new
mechanised units.28 The migration o f cavalrymen to the tank corps
was testimony to the versatility o f the cavalrymen but also to the
fact that the Red cavalry suffered relatively minor losses during the
purges compared to the situation elsewhere in the Red Army.29
The Red Army suffered from two great disruptions in the
1930s. Until the early 1930s, the size o f the Red Army was about
half a million men. In response to the deteriorating international
situation, the regular Red Army in 1935 was required to integrate
400,000 extra soldiers. In 1936, the Red Army increased by a
further 50 per cent or 400,000 more men. By 1939, there were
more than three million in the Red Army and that figure would rise
to more than five million two years later.30 The Red Army simply
could not find officers to cope with the expansion. By 1935 the
Red Army needed 130,000 officers but were 17,000 officers short.
At the end o f 1938, the Red Army was more than ninety thousand
short o f the number o f officers it required.31

The purge made the task o f properly leading the Red Army
even more impossible. According to the most recent estimates,
some 44,000 officers were arrested and 15,000 o f these were
executed.32 It goes without saying that the purges were a disaster
for the Red Army and in particular for its leadership. But it would
have been worse had there not been a pool o f unpurged cavalry
commanders to employ to lead the reconstituted mechanised corps
o f the post-purge era. The Red cavalry represented an oasis o f
stability, the core around which the Red command could rebuild.
In 1940, four o f nine new mechanised corps found themselves
under the command o f former cavalrymen.33
It is difficult to know exactly how many cavalrymen moved
from the cavalry to other arms. The purges and the outbreak o f war
coincided with dramatic reductions in the size o f the cavalry arm.
In 1937, the Red cavalry counted seven cavalry corps and thirtytwo divisions. In June 1941, only four cavalry corps and thirteen
divisions remained, in other words, less than half the number o f
Red cavalry four years earlier.34 The thirteen divisions in 1941
required 6,000 commanders.35 Thus at least that number, that is,
6,000 cavalry commanders, were made redundant in the years
1937-41. Some moved sideways within the Red cavalry, some left
the Red Army and some were purged. It is most likely that the
majority migrated to the infantry and tank forces. Many more
would follow after the Nazi invasion.36 The Red cavalry produced
fifteen marshals and countless senior officers who made their mark
on battlefields from the Caucasus to Berlin.37
The impact o f the Red cavalryman upon the performance o f
the Red Army in the Second World War needs further
investigation. It is often remarked that the Red Army in 1941
showed none o f the verve and determination it would display later
in the war.38 The former cavalrymen, like the rest o f the Red
Army, started slowly as they grappled with new battlefield
challenges. The longer the war went, the more familiar the
situation must have seemed to those who fought, or Carefully
studied, the experience o f the Red cavalry in the Civil War.
Holding ground at the frontier is not normally a task for
cavalrymen. Theirs was a world o f manoeuvre against an
overextended enemy, o f rapid movement and self-sacrificing

determination when cornered. The situation o f 1943 was every bit
as desperate as that o f 1941. On the other hand, the longer the war
went, the more it came to resemble the type o f operations for
which Red cavalrymen had trained for twenty years. The former
cavalrymen appeared less demoralised than other parts o f the Red
Army, perhaps because the purge touched them less but also
because they had long viewed themselves as a committed elite,
whatever the critics might say about the decline o f the cavalry.
They were confident in each other, proud o f their cavalry identity
and well versed in responding to change.
It is probably fair to say that historians find it easier to
explain the desperate situation in which the Red Army found itself
in 1941 compared to the equally important question o f how the
Red Army rescued itself from the brink in 1943-45. The unhappy
legacy o f a powerful and anachronistic cavalry faction is a standard
part o f the story told about the Red Army in 1937-41. The
argument here is that the cavalrymen should be looked upon in a
different light. The Red cavalrymen proved to be competent and
adaptable soldiers when redeployed in infantry or tank corps, a not
surprising outcome given their Civil War and inter-war experience.
Trained as an elite and to respect both mobility and firepower, the
former Red cavalrymen were well prepared not for past wars but
for wars o f the future and were more than adequate raw material
for a reconstituted and ultimately successful Red Army.
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